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T his paper examines four hypotheses: (i) in Brazil, as in other 
peripheral countries in the post-crisis context, a policy choice appears to 
have been made for a flexible exchange rate within a currency band (“dirty 
float”); (ii) the underlying reasons for this policy appear to have more to do 
with pass-through of exchange-rate variations and precautionary demand 
for reserves than with the maintenance of a competitive real exchange 
rate; (iii) in the country’s peculiar situation, considerable capital mobility is 
conjoined with large and liquid financial derivatives markets and a reserves 
build-up policy that carries a high fiscal cost; (iv) until April 2006, reserves 
accumulated in much the same way under the floating exchange-rate 
system as they had under the currency band regime; there have been 
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In 1999, in line with the dominant trend among 
leading emerging economies, the Brazilian authorities 
adopted a floating exchange-rate system. The managed 
exchange-rate policies (fixed rate or bands) that were 
the rule in these economies in the 1990s had the virtue 
of  ensuring the stability of  the nominal exchange 
rate (one of the key prices in capitalist economies), 
but proved extremely vulnerable to real currency 
appreciation and speculative attacks, culminating in a 
series of currency crises in the second half of the decade. 
After these crises, the policies mentioned gave way to 
floating exchange-rate systems. Although this system 
was adopted officially in most emerging countries, in 
practice the respective monetary authorities sought 
to check exchange-rate movements by intervening 
actively in the currency markets. In other words, the 
predominant exchange-rate regime in the period since 
the crisis has actually been a dirty float with different 
degrees of intervention, in which a central bank presence 
has been the rule and not the exception. Systematic 
currency market intervention —“fear of  floating”, 
as Calvo and Reinhart (2000) put it— appears to be 
the result of “defensive strategies” in an international 
financial environment characterized by alternately 
rising and falling capital flows. They include: (i) 
reducing external vulnerability by building up excess 
official reserves, or “precautionary demand” (Flood 
and Marion, 2002; Jeanne and Rancière, 2006), and 
(ii) adopting export-based growth policies (Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2005; Aizenman and 
Lee, 2005; Soto and García, 2006).
The dirty float system relieved the acute external 
vulnerability of the Brazilian economy, which had 
resulted in a current-account deficit of about 4% of 
gross domestic product (gdp) during the fixed or 
managed exchange-rate period (1995-1998), with a 
consequent US$ 180 billion expansion of external 
liabilities. Between 2003 and mid-2007, when the 
international financial crisis originating in the United 
States subprime mortgage market broke out, this 
regime was implemented in an exceptionally favourable 
international context. Rising commodity prices and a 
high level of international financial liquidity ensured 
a continuing balance-of-payments adjustment despite 
the tendency for the real to appreciate.
What will be examined here is the way the 
floating exchange-rate system was managed in Brazil 
between 1999 and 2007, with emphasis on the period 
of abundant capital flows into peripheral countries 
(from 2003 until mid-2007). Four hypotheses will be 
examined: (i) as in other peripheral countries in the 
post-crisis context, Brazil appears to have opted for 
a dirty float policy; (ii) the underlying reasons for this 
policy appear to have more to do with pass-through 
of exchange-rate variations to domestic prices and 
precautionary demand for reserves than with the other 
factors that would justify “fear of floating”, such as 
the desire to maintain a competitive real exchange 
rate; (iii) the Brazilian experience is characterized not 
only by a combination of considerable capital mobility 
and large and liquid financial derivatives markets, but 
also by a lack of transparency regarding the goals and 
targets of exchange-rate policy and the high fiscal cost 
of the reserves build-up policy; (iv) until April 2006, 
reserves continued to accumulate under the floating 
exchange-rate system much as they had under the 
currency band regime; there have been changes since 
then owing to the rapid growth of reserves.
This study is divided into four sections. Following 
this Introduction, section II presents the institutional 
format and determinants of  the Brazilian floating 
exchange-rate system and calculates the indicators of 
the country’s “fear of floating”. Section III analyses 
the way this regime was managed in the 2003-2007 
period and section IV conducts an econometric 
exercise designed to bring out the factors determining 
changes in currency reserves and their accumulation 
pattern under the managed and flexible exchange-
rate systems. Lastly, some final considerations are 
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The floating exchange-rate system was introduced 
by the Central Bank of Brazil in January 1999 after 
speculative attacks had greatly depleted reserves during 
the preceding months, leading the authorities to seek 
financial assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund (imf). Under the Brazilian institutional model, it 
is the Central Bank that determines the exchange-rate 
regime, its targets and its management (i.e., exchange-
rate policy).1 However, international reserves belong 
to the Union.2 They are administered by the Central 
Bank, and the accounting results associated with 
management of the currency are converted every six 
months into Union revenue or expenditure items.
The new exchange-rate system preceded the 
inflation targeting regime established in June 1999. 
Despite its precedence in time, it seems that in the 
institutional context of the economic policy framework 
in place since 1999 (whose pillars also include primary 
surplus targets), the floating exchange-rate system 
ranks well below the inflation targeting regime, which 
was established by presidential decree and whose 
goals and indicators are the responsibility of  the 
National Monetary Council (cmn). This hypothesis 
is supported by the scarcity of  official documents 
referring to the floating exchange-rate system and 
its management and the fact that none of  them 
(including Notification no. 6,565, which instituted the 
floating exchange-rate system) lay down the general 
macroeconomic objectives of this regime.3 Although 
the notification does establish the aim of exchange-rate 
policy (mitigating short-term exchange-rate volatility), 
it does not spell out the underlying macroeconomic 
objective. As Moreno (2005) points out, this aim 
may be subordinated to different objectives that are 
not mutually exclusive, such as controlling inflation, 
1 Emerging countries have different models for regulating currency 
markets. Central banks are not necessarily responsible for running 
exchange-rate policy and managing reserves (Moser-Boehm, 
2005).
2 In accordance with Article 21 of the 1988 Federal Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Brazil.
3 The Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br) has no 
section dealing with the exchange-rate system or exchange-rate 
policy, whereas there is a huge section on the inflation targeting 
system. The only explicit reference to exchange-rate policy is in 
the annual reports of the Bank.
supporting external competitiveness and maintaining 
financial stability.
By reviewing the proceedings of  the Central 
Bank of Brazil Monetary Policy Committee (copom) 
and the inflation reports, it is possible to form some 
hypotheses about these objectives.4 References to the 
effects of the exchange rate on domestic price indices 
in some of these documents (which form part of the 
inflation targeting system) reveal that, besides the 
preservation of  financial stability, management of 
the floating exchange-rate system in Brazil also has 
the (sometimes unacknowledged) aim of controlling 
inflation. The lack of disclosure about the objectives 
of this system appears to be due not to any explicit 
strategy to enhance its effectiveness (given that 
Central Bank interventions in the currency market 
are fully disclosed) or to accountability standards 
being lower than for monetary policy, but rather to 
its subordination to that policy.5 This being so, one 
theory might be that the macroeconomic goals of 
the floating exchange-rate system are implicit and 
largely coincide with those of the inflation targeting 
regime, namely price stability and financial system 
stability. These goals have not been constant over 
time, however, but have varied with a more general 
factor influencing the management of this regime, 
namely the phase in the international liquidity cycle, 
as detailed below.
The obvious hierarchical relationship between the 
monetary system (dominant) and the exchange-rate 
system (subordinate) in the institutional framework 
of economic policy is not peculiar to Brazil. On the 
contrary, whether because exchange-rate movements 
are particularly liable to feed through to inflation 
in emerging economies, or because of their greater 
vulnerability to the recent instability of capital flows, 
a number of  countries that have paired a floating 
exchange rate with inflation targeting have included 
inflation control and financial system stability among 
the macroeconomic objectives of  the exchange-
rate system. This hierarchy reflects the vital role of 
4 copom sets the base interest rate in Brazil.
5 In general, as Moser-Boehm (2005) points out, governance aspects 
seem to be less explicit for foreign-exchange intervention than for 
monetary policy decisions.
II
the floating exchange-rate system in Brazil
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exchange-rate movements in the virtuous functioning 
of inflation targeting regimes in these countries, and 
not their irrelevance (Grenville, 2000; Mohanty and 
Scatigna, 2005).
The main peculiarity of this pairing in Brazil is 
the fact that these goals are not made explicit, even 
though the Central Bank is the institution responsible 
for managing both systems, a factor that minimizes the 
likelihood of the kind of policy coordination problems 
seen in certain countries where exchange-rate policy 
is conducted by the government. In economies that 
thus combine a floating exchange rate with inflation 
targeting, for example, it is explicitly recognized that 
stabilizing inflation requires exchange-rate management 
to take account of a high level of trade exposure and 
pass-through (Ho and McCauley, 2003).
Where the legal situation is concerned, Notification 
6,565 stipulates that official interventions in the 
currency market should be occasional, suggesting that 
the exchange rate will be allowed to fluctuate in a way 
that approximates to a “clean float”. In the situation 
that followed the crisis of the 1990s, however, what 
seems to have predominated in Brazil, as in other 
peripheral countries, was a “dirty float” exchange-
rate policy. Furthermore, the goals and targets of 
this policy did not remain constant following its 
adoption and it was not confined to interventions 
in the spot currency market, but involved a broader 
array of instruments. Before analysing the different 
dimensions of the dirty float policy, it is important 
to answer two related questions: (i) is there “fear of 
floating” in Brazil? (ii) what were the factors that 
shaped this policy?
A preliminary response to the first question can be 
sought in the indicators of relative volatility developed 
by Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) to detect the 
existence (or otherwise) of “fear of floating” in emerging 
countries that have adopted floating exchange-rate 
systems. These indicators are an attempt to solve, at 
least in part, the problems raised by the indicators of 
absolute volatility (in international reserves, interest 
rates and exchange rates) presented in Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000)—measured by the frequency with 
which monthly fluctuations in the variables remain 
within predetermined ranges throughout the period 
considered.6
6 There are three main problems with these indicators: (i) the 
interest-rate volatility indicator tends to overestimate variations 
in countries with higher average interest rates, a description that 
fits most emerging countries; (ii) not all interest-rate changes 
Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) use indicators 
to assess relative volatility between exchange and 
interest rates and between exchange rates and reserves, 
using the standard deviation as a measure of volatility 
for these rates and, in the case of reserves (measured 
in monetary units), taking the standard deviation 
divided by the mean of the M2 aggregate (to avoid 
distortions due to different units). These indicators have 
the merit of taking account of the level differentials 
of the variables (in accordance with the use of these 
volatility measures) and of showing how the monetary 
authorities have reacted (through higher interest rates 
or currency market intervention) relative to the scale 
of the shock experienced.
Souza (2005) and Souza and Hoff  (2006) 
calculated similar indicators for Brazil from January 
1999 to December 2005 and concluded that, taking 
the mean of  those seven years, there was no fear 
of floating in Brazil. The results obtained by those 
authors indicate very similar values in the indicators 
of Brazil and the United States (0.26 and 0.23 in the 
case of the exchange-rate/reserves indicator and 1.39 
and 1.33 in the case of the exchange-rate/interest-rate 
indicator) and suggest that the exchange-rate system 
in operation is close to a genuine float (the indicators 
for Asian countries are much lower and indicate that 
interest rates and reserves are being used to stabilize 
the exchange rate). Updating this calculation to June 
2007 (see table 1) yields a practically identical result 
for the exchange-rate/reserves indicator (0.25), which 
bears out the true float hypothesis, and a lower result 
in the case of the exchange-rate/interest-rate indicator 
(1.13), which would indicate a greater willingness to 
reflect attempts to stabilize the exchange rate; (iii) exchange-rate 
volatility may be the result of powerful external shocks affecting 
the country.
TABLE 1






January 1999-December 2005 1.39 0.26
January 1999-June 2007 1.13 0.25
January 1999-December 2002 1.34 0.42
January 2003-June 2007 0.73 0.17
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  data from the 
Central Bank of  Brazil.
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use interest rates to stabilize the exchange rate over 
this longer period (January 1999-June 2007).
Analysing the behaviour of  relative volatility 
indicators over the whole period (January 1999-
December 2005 or January 1999-June 2007) does 
not seem the best approach, as it masks importance 
differences in their trajectory following the adoption 
of the floating exchange-rate system. These differences 
are largely associated with the behaviour of capital 
flows to emerging countries, and thus to Brazil. As 
figure 1 shows, it is possible to identify two distinct 
phases in this cycle from 1999 onward, each with its 
own challenges and room for manoeuvre in exchange-
rate policy.
The first period, which began in January 1999 
and ended in December 2002, was the “down” phase 
in the liquidity cycle of  the 1990s. During those 
four years, the rise in risk aversion among global 
investors after the Asian and Russian crises led to 
a sharp retrenchment in flows of  external financial 
capital to emerging countries (portfolio investment 
and other capital flows, including bank lending in 
its various forms). Total flows did not turn negative 
thanks to the relatively favourable performance of 
foreign direct investment.
The second phase lasted from 2003 to mid-2007, 
with an upturn in the liquidity cycle beginning in the 
former year. The level of liquidity in the latter year was 
unprecedented. As in other cyclical booms preceding 
busts, the first half  of  2007 was characterized by 
excessive euphoria that resulted in an extraordinary 
level of absorption of external resources by emerging 
economies, easily offsetting the lacklustre performance 
of the second half  of the year after the outbreak of 
the United States subprime mortgage crisis. Net flows, 
which include direct and portfolio investment and 
bank lending, totalled US$ 617.7 billion.7
Calculating relative volatility indicators for these 
two periods reveals the differences of behaviour in 
the “pessimistic” and “optimistic” phases of  the 
international liquidity cycle. In the period from January 
1999 to December 2002, both indicators (exchange 
rate/interest rate and exchange rate/reserves) reached 
high values (1.34 and 0.42, respectively) relative to 
the whole period, and particularly the second period 
(January 2003-June 2007). Conversely, the results for 
this period (0.73 and 0.17, respectively) are lower than 
the period total and than those of the first period.
Although the indicators calculated by Hausmann, 
Panizza and Stein (2000) for the two subperiods 
(January 1999-December 2002 and January 2003-
June 2007) captured major differences in relative 
7  See Biancareli (2009), World Bank (2009), Lane (2008) and 
Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) on the subject of  international 
liquidity cycles in emerging countries.
FIGURE 1
net capital flows into emerging countries
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volatility between the external financing bust and boom 
phases, they are clearly insufficient to characterize the 
floating exchange-rate system in Brazil and explain 
the specificities of its operation in these two phases. 
According to these indicators, Brazil had less “fear of 
floating” in the pessimistic phase than in the optimistic 
one, which does not seem to make sense, given not only 
the strong pass-through effect but also the increased 
external vulnerability of the economy and the greater 
currency mismatch for the private sector in the first 
phase.8 The lower relative volatility in the second 
phase does not reflect a greater “fear of floating” but 
rather the positive effects of the favourable external 
context on the volatility of the exchange rate and the 
other financial variables (interest and reserves). The 
resumption of currency purchasing by the Central 
Bank of Brazil in the spot currency market from late 
2004, made possible precisely by this context, also 
seems to have helped reduce this volatility (see section 
III). While these indicators were higher than those 
used by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), they also have 
some limitations: reserve purchases may have been a 
precautionary demand strategy and thus not aimed 
at influencing the level or volatility of the exchange 
rate, besides which the monetary authorities have other 
exchange-rate and even economic policy instruments 
(including capital controls) available to them to meet 
their exchange-rate targets.
This means that, if  analysed in isolation without 
considering the external and internal (structural and 
macroeconomic) factors influencing the management 
of the floating exchange-rate system, these indicators 
can lead to faulty conclusions. The phase of  the 
international liquidity cycle influences the management 
of  the floating exchange-rate system in emerging 
economies generally and Brazil in particular, owing to 
its high degree of financial openness. While this cycle 
is the main external factor influencing management 
of the system, the degree of financial openness can be 
regarded as the main structural internal factor.
The financial opening of the Brazilian economy 
began in the late 1980s and was extended over the 
course of the 1990s. The institutional changes made 
in that period led to significant liberalization of 
foreign portfolio investment in the domestic financial 
market and the international capital market. Thus, 
8 Studies such as those of  Hakura and Choudhri (2001) and 
Mohanty and Scatigna (2005) have suggested that Brazil and 
Turkey are among the countries with the highest levels of currency 
pass-through.
when the floating exchange-rate system came into 
effect, on 16 January 1999, financial opening in the 
Brazilian economy was already quite well advanced. 
A decisive measure that opened it up considerably 
more was adopted a year later, on 26 January 2000. 
Resolution 2,689 deregulated applications by foreign 
investors in share and fixed-income security markets 
and gave them unrestricted access to the local financial 
derivatives market, where they had hitherto been 
limited to operations to cover their positions in spot 
markets. Although the Brazilian financial derivatives 
market was already more highly developed than most 
emerging countries’ by the late 1990s, foreign investors’ 
freedom of  action in the Mercantile & Futures 
Exchange (bm&f) would greatly increase its liquidity 
and depth and have considerable repercussions on 
the management of exchange-rate policy that would 
only be felt in the phase of optimism, particularly 
after 2004 (see section III).
This high degree of financial openness, and global 
investors’ access to the organized financial derivatives 
market in particular, intensified the effects of booms 
and busts in capital flows on the country’s key prices, 
particularly the exchange rate (which became the main 
mechanism for transmitting capital flow volatility to 
financial markets and the real economy), but also 
reinforced the interaction between exchange-rate, 
monetary and fiscal policies (inevitable in economies 
that embraced financial globalization) and reduced 
their respective room for manoeuvre. In this context, 
management of  the floating exchange-rate system 
(and also of the inflation targeting policy) was largely 
subordinated to the wealth allocation decisions of 
global investors. However, the interaction between 
external factors (international liquidity cycle) and 
structural internal ones (degree of financial openness) 
had different repercussions for system management 
in the “pessimistic” and “optimistic” phases of the 
cycle. There were different challenges and degrees 
of freedom for exchange-rate policy depending, to 
a large extent, on the balance-of-payments situation 
and external vulnerability of the Brazilian economy 
—these being arguably the most decisive domestic 
macroeconomic variables affecting it.
The further opening of the Brazilian economy in 
2000, when Arminio Fraga Neto was President of the 
Central Bank of Brazil, did not have concrete effects 
during the early stages of the floating exchange-rate 
system (January 1999 to December 2002), when the 
country was affected by external currency constraints 
and the consequent structural scarcity of sellers and 
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excess of buyers in the Brazilian currency market. In 
this context, foreign investors scaled back their positions 
in Brazilian assets, and the bm&f  was no exception. 
The volumes traded on that exchange increased in 
1999, once the upheaval caused by the alteration in 
the exchange-rate regime had passed, and in 2000, 
only to fall back again following the speculative 
attack in 2001 (see table 2). A decisive contribution 
to the “evaporation” of liquidity in this market in a 
context of  excess dollar demand (whether for risk 
cover or for speculation) was the ban on the Central 
Bank operating with currency derivatives that was 
imposed under the agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (imf) in March 1999 (and retained 
in the 2001 agreement). In consequence, the effects of 
the mismatch between foreign currency supply (weak 
flows) and demand (flows and stocks) have fallen 
mainly on the spot foreign-exchange market and on 
public securities indexed to the exchange rate.
During this period, the monetary authority’s room 
for manoeuvre in pursuing its main goals was severely 
limited by three factors: (i) its inability to operate in 
the currency derivatives market, (ii) the limited volume 
of international reserves available for interventions in 
the spot currency market (less than the assets available 
to the Central Bank of Brazil because of the limits 
imposed by the agreement with the imf) and (iii) the 
now very large build-up of public securities indexed 
to the exchange rate.
In their efforts to meet the goals of the floating 
exchange-rate system in the pessimistic phase, the 
Central Bank authorities did not confine themselves 
to intervening in the spot currency market but used 
other exchange-rate policy instruments, such as issuing 
securities indexed to the exchange rate and currency 
swaps, which are equivalent to selling dollars forward 
and buying contracts for Interfinancial Deposits (di), 
securities that yield the Brazilian short-term interest 
rate. In 1999 particularly, the monetary authority also 
adopted regulatory measures to stimulate the supply 
of currency in the foreign-exchange market and, most 
importantly, to restrain demand.
TABLE 2
volumes traded on the Mercantile & Futures 
Exchange, by asset type
(Dollars)
Year Currency Interest-rate
1999 12 166 257 25 292 621
2000 12 164 002 25 290 221
2001 21 612 354 43 835 697
2002 17 349 055 71 186 758
2003 19 320 993 83 553 886
2004 27 421 447 139 066 000
2005 41 810 287 146 655 688
2006 59 824 092 174 569 023
2007 115 883 665 263 434 704
Source: summary of  Mercantile & Futures Exchange (bm&f) 
data.
III
the floating exchange-rate system in the 
optimistic phase
The combination of  financial openness and deep 
derivatives markets proved a “double-edged sword” 
when it came to managing the floating exchange-rate 
system in Brazil, with each “edge” manifesting itself  
at different phases in the international liquidity cycle. 
As summarized earlier, during the phase of pessimism 
and scarce external resources, this combination 
intensified the effectiveness of  speculative attacks 
against the Brazilian currency and reduced the scope 
for exchange-rate management to restrain pressure for 
devaluation. In the optimistic phase, which began in 
2003 and lasted until mid-2007 (when the subprime 
mortgage crisis broke out in the United States), with 
capital flows returning and external trade and flows 
showing positive results (owing to the depreciation 
in the earlier period, but also to the international 
trade cycle), the adoption of an over-tight monetary 
policy resulted in an uninterrupted trend towards 
appreciation, which was mainly responsible for the 
effectiveness of the inflation targeting policy.
Although kept subordinate to inflation targeting, 
exchange-rate management was given greater latitude by 
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the benign external environment, and this contributed 
decisively to the favourable evolution of the balance 
of  payments (with the current account in surplus 
from 2003 and the financial account after 2005). It is 
possible to identify two distinct periods of exchange-
rate management in this phase of optimism, the first 
running from January 2003 to November 2004 and 
the second from December 2004 to mid-2007. The 
Central Bank barely intervened in the spot currency 
market in the first period. This was as might have 
been expected from January 2003 to July 2004, when 
the exchange rate remained stable following the early 
months spent correcting the excessive interventionism 
of exchange-rate policy in 2002. Even after July 2004, 
when the currency began its long appreciation, the 
authority was only intermittently active in the market, 
given the implicit objective of using this process to 
achieve its inflation targets. In that period, the main 
strategy of exchange-rate policy was the aggressive 
redemption of currency bonds, which continued into 
the following period.
The second period (December 2004 to June 2007) 
was characterized by the return of the Central Bank as 
a buyer in the two segments of the currency market, 
spot and forward. Intervention in the spot market was 
temporarily suspended between March and September 
2005, even though the real continued to appreciate. 
From October 2005, the Central Bank maintained 
a constant presence in this market with the explicit 
goal of accumulating international reserves without 
imposing a trend or floor on currency fluctuations 
or heightening volatility in the market (bcb, 2007). 
Given the restrictive monetary policy of the period, 
the authority consistently adopted a strategy of 
sterilized intervention, i.e., it set out to neutralize the 
monetary impact of its currency purchases by selling 
public securities on the open market.
The policy of accumulating international reserves, 
adopted in late 2004 to strengthen the country’s 
external position directly (by creating a “cushion” of 
foreign-currency liquidity) and indirectly (by positively 
influencing external ratings) came up against two major 
limitations: the large build-up of mainly short-term 
securitized public debt indexed to the policy rate (the 
Special System of Clearance and Custody or SELIC 
rate) and the large differential between domestic and 
external interest rates, which made these reserves 
extremely costly to maintain (in absolute terms and 
by comparison with other emerging countries). A 
rough calculation of  this cost in June 2007, when 
reserves reached US$ 147 billion and there was a 7.08% 
differential between the selic rate and the yield on 
10-year Treasury notes (the favoured destination for 
these reserves), puts it at US$ 10.5 billion a year.9 If  
account is taken of exchange-rate movements from late 
2004, when the reserves build-up policy was renewed, 
this cost was even higher, as the dollar depreciated 
against the real over the period.
This same interest-rate differential, in the context 
of  a sharp reduction in country risk, stimulated 
short-term capital inflows in pursuit of  profits from 
arbitrage or speculation and played a decisive role 
in the appreciation of  the currency after September 
2004. In other words, a high policy rate in the Brazilian 
economy has two simultaneous and contradictory 
effects: on the one hand, it stimulates the build-up 
of  the country’s short-term external liabilities (in 
the form of fixed-income portfolio investments and 
short-term debt), while on the other, it increases the 
cost of maintaining the foreign-currency reserves that 
are the “cushion” needed to cope with the potential 
for this liability to go into reverse. It is no coincidence 
that the financial account recorded a surplus of 
US$ 87 billion in 2007.
Certain factors contributed decisively to the 
boom in capital flows in 2007, even as the policy of 
policy rate cuts continued. First, the expectation of 
achieving an “investment grade” rating (which was 
only awarded in late April 2008) stimulated foreign 
portfolio investment. Second, in January 2007 the 
Central Bank slowed down the pace of cuts in the 
policy rate (from 0.5% to 0.25%) and country risk 
continued to diminish in the international market, 
ensuring a continuing large gap between the selic 
rate and the so-called “arbitrage-neutral selic” rate 
(see figure 2), which is the sum of country risk and 
the lowest-risk interest rate (the federal funds rate, 
which is the United States Federal Reserve policy 
rate) and represents the cost of Brazilian borrowing 
abroad. This encouraged investors to arrange short-
term credit lines to carry out arbitrage operations in 
the local financial market.
These same factors led foreign investors to 
maintain or even extend their positions in the Brazilian 
financial derivatives market. Derivatives linked to the 
exchange rate of the real, traded locally (bm&f) and in 
the over-the-counter market, played a decisive role in 
9 Working independently, McCulley and Tolouil (2007) used a 
similar methodology and reached a result equivalent to the one 
presented in this paper.
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currency appreciation from 2004.10 The positions of 
these investors were largely in short selling contracts 
that turned a profit when the real appreciated. Thus, 
in the optimistic phase of the international liquidity 
cycle alone, the combination of a floating exchange 
rate and foreign investors’ unrestricted access to the 
bm&f  led to an increase in the liquidity and depth of 
this market and, consequently, in opportunities for 
arbitrage and speculation with the exchange rate of 
the real. Against a background of declining country 
and exchange-rate risk, foreign investors’ operations 
in the spot and forward currency markets heightened 
the appreciation of the real over 2007. This tendency, 
in turn, further increased the profitability of these 
operations and encouraged more of them, creating 
self-fulfilling prophesies. With the currency supply 
thus expanding, the Central Bank of Brazil stepped 
up its interventions in the spot currency market, lifting 
Brazilian international reserves to unprecedented 
levels. Despite this large-scale official intervention, 
however, the real continued to appreciate steadily (in 
nominal and real terms).
10 The financial derivative mechanism employed in this over-the-
counter market is the non-deliverable forward (ndf).
The continued appreciation of  the real 
notwithstanding the currency purchases by the Brazilian 
monetary authority was due, in part, to the strategy 
of intervening in the spot currency market.11 In the 
up phase of the international liquidity cycle, the goal 
of Central Bank buying in the currency market was 
to reconstitute a foreign-currency liquidity “cushion” 
and reduce exchange-rate volatility, while trying not 
to influence the appreciating trend of the real (which 
proved essential to the effectiveness of the targeting 
policy). In this context, the level of  the exchange 
rate was not a target of exchange-rate management. 
The Brazilian authority only intervened in certain 
circumstances to reduce the pace of  appreciation 
of the real, adopting a strategy of “leaning against 
the wind” since sudden changes in the level of the 
currency can increase uncertainty, stimulate speculative 
movements and exacerbate exchange-rate volatility.12 
In accordance with its general macroeconomic goals 
and their respective targets, the Central Bank pursued 
11 As in most of these countries (Archer, 2005), the bulk of trading 
is done by electronic auction (Mercantile & Futures Exchange 
clearing system, introduced in 2006) or by telephone via Central 
Bank of Brazil dealers in the interbank market.
12  Regarding this strategy, see Mihalijek (2005).
FIGURE 2
sELiC and arbitrage-neutral sELiC rates
(Percentages)
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a strategy, announced in advance to its dealers, of 
acting at day’s end before the market closed to “mop 
up” dollars at prevailing prices, without seeking to 
influence market quotations. As Archer (2005) points 
out, this is precisely the strategy recommended when 
the monetary authority is not setting out to influence 
the exchange rate.
However, while the real might have appreciated 
much less dramatically if  the Central Bank of Brazil 
had adopted another intervention strategy in the 
spot currency market, it would have appreciated 
nonetheless. It can plausibly be argued that a change 
in this strategy would only have slowed the pace of 
exchange-rate appreciation, but would not have been 
sufficient to halt it given the extent of the economy’s 
financial openness. In this context, contrary to what the 
conventional theoretical approach assumes, emerging 
countries, vulnerable as they are to sudden surges or 
stops in capital movements, are actually faced with 
an “impossible duality” (Flassbeck, 2001): adoption 
of a floating exchange-rate regime does not guarantee 
automatic adjustment of the balance of payments 
and monetary policy independence; on the contrary, 
it strengthens the relationship between the policy rate 
and the nominal exchange rate and the influence of 
global investors’ portfolio decisions on these key prices. 
This relationship manifested itself  in different ways 
depending on the phase in the international liquidity 
cycle.13 In the period of abundant liquidity (see figure 
2), it was interest-rate movements that came to shape 
the trajectory of the exchange rate. Furthermore, the 
inability of the Central Bank to control the policy 
rate and nominal exchange rate simultaneously in 
a context of freely mobile capital was taken to an 
extreme by two specific factors: the high fiscal cost 
of sterilization operations and the existence of large 
and liquid financial derivatives markets.
A brief international comparison will illustrate the 
relative size of this market and the amount of (mainly 
foreign investors’) money riding on the appreciation 
of the real. Not only is the bm&f  one of the world’s 
leading derivatives exchanges – specifically, it ranked 
eighth in the two-month period January-February 2007 
– and the second-largest emerging-market exchange 
(only the South Korean exchange, where share index 
options predominate, is larger), but the number of 
13 Conversely, as Mohanty and Scatigna (2005) point out, economies 
that maintain some degree of control over capital flows are able to 
insulate their monetary and exchange-rate policies from the effects 
of these cycles, at least in part.
contracts traded there experienced the fastest growth 
of any of them between the first two months of 2006 
and the first two months of 2007.14
Thus, the most singular feature of the Brazilian 
currency market is the size, liquidity and depth of its 
forward segment, characteristics that are inseparable 
from the unrestricted access of foreign investors to 
this segment, which strengthened the channels of 
transmission between the latter’s investment decisions, 
the interest rate and the nominal exchange rate 
and made arbitrage between offshore and onshore 
currency derivatives trades a viable proposition. This 
characteristic of the Brazilian currency market also 
shaped the management of exchange-rate policy. From 
February 2005, the Central Bank decided to offer 
currency derivatives, known as reverse swaps (which 
are exactly the opposite of the swaps made available 
during periods of depreciation in the real). With its 
reverse swap operations, the monetary authority 
positioned itself  at the opposite extreme from foreign 
investors in bm&f  currency trades, taking dollar 
purchase positions with a view to easing downward 
pressure on the dollar (i.e., appreciation of the real) in 
the future. As with interventions in the spot currency 
market, the provision of reverse swaps only slowed 
the pace of appreciation in the real, preventing the 
forward dollar price (and thence the spot price) from 
plummeting.
Given the context of extensive capital mobility and 
the existence of large and liquid financial derivatives 
markets, the Brazilian monetary authority would be 
unable to determine both the interest rate and the 
exchange rate of the real simultaneously. By opting for 
a tight monetary policy to ensure the effectiveness of 
the inflation targeting policy, the authority abandoned 
any kind of  target for the nominal exchange rate, 
which became the determined variable in the system 
and, at the same time, the key to this effectiveness. 
In this period of plentiful external liquidity and an 
appreciating real, the high level of  pass-through 
14 See Johnson (2007). In the first two months of 2007, real-related 
currency derivatives negotiated on the Mercantile & Futures Exchange 
occupied an unprecedented position in terms of the number of 
contracts traded in organized currency derivatives markets: “bm&f’s 
U.S. Dollar contract led the sector for the second year in a row 
with a 51.4% increase to 10.97 million contracts. It was follow by 
cme’s Euro fx contract which rose 22% to 6.73 million contracts.” 
Another explanation for this unprecedented figure is that some 
global investors used these contracts as a proxy for derivatives of 
emerging currencies that correlate closely with the real (such as 
the Turkish lira and the South African rand) but are not traded 
in deep and liquid organized derivatives markets.
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in the Brazilian economy became an “ally” of this 
policy, given the positive effects of appreciation on 
domestic inflation.
Thus, exchange-rate policy cannot be said to have 
been ineffective in the period. The Central Bank was 
not only fully aware of the role played by appreciation 
of the real when it came to meeting strict inflation 
targets, but actually induced it by running a tight 
monetary policy (alleging demand pressures). The 
goals of intervention were to contain volatility in the 
currency market and, most importantly, to build up 
reserves, and both were achieved fairly successfully.
Nonetheless, this policy choice had two adverse 
side-effects. First, there was the real-term appreciation 
of the Brazilian currency. As figure 3 shows, following 
correction of the excessively interventionist stance of 
exchange-rate policy fro m 2002 to early 2003 and 
the brief  spell of  stability between May 2003 and 
May 2004, the real strengthened virtually without 
interruption, both bilaterally (against the dollar) and 
effectively (against a basket of 13 currencies). In the 
up phase of the international liquidity cycle (January 
2003 to June 2007), the real experienced a bilateral 
appreciation (against the dollar) of  55.9% and an 
effective appreciation of 46.9% (this lower percentage 
was due to the dollar’s loss of value against the other 
currencies over the period).
The second effect was a consequence of  the 
first and consisted in a loss of competitiveness for 
manufactured goods exports, as the main commodities 
exported by Brazil benefited in the appreciation period 
from rising international prices.15 According to the 
export profitability index calculated by the Foreign 
Trade Studies Centre Foundation (funcex), the main
 
15 This rise was associated both with demand from China and with 
speculation in futures markets, stimulated by a context of dollar 
devaluation and low interest rates in the central countries. See 
Gottschalk and Prates (2006) and unctad (2009).
FIGURE 3
indices of the real exchange rate (real/dollar) and effective exchange rate (real/
basket of 13 currencies)
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  data from the Foreign Trade Studies Centre Foundation (funcex).
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manufacturing export sectors recorded a sharp decline 
in profitability between 2003 and 2007 (see figure 4), 
and this was most acute precisely in those with the 
greatest technology content and value added (such as 
electronic equipment, spare parts and other vehicles, 
machinery and tractors and automotive vehicles). 
Conversely, in commodity processing industries, which 
also benefited from this rise, profits either fell by less 
(iron and steel and non-ferrous metallurgy) or actually 
increased (oil refining and petrochemicals).
FIGURE 4
Export profitability index
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  data from the Foreign Trade Studies Centre Foundation (funcex).
N.B.: The sectoral export profitability indices are calculated from the average nominal exchange rate for the month (real/dollar), corrected 
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IV
the evolution and determinants of international 
reserves: an econometric exercise
This section will seek to explain the behaviour of 
international reserves in Brazil between 1995 and 2007, 
considering that two exchange-rate regimes applied in 
that time (managed exchange rate in 1995-1998 and 
floating rate in 1999-2007), with a view to establishing 
whether there were changes in the determinants and 
pattern of reserves accumulation under the dirty float 
system by comparison with the system of exchange-
rate bands.
The econometric model used is a univariate 
structural time series model.16 The following series 
16 The methodology proposed by Harvey and Shephard (1993) 
was used. Starting from a set of observations of a single variable, 
were used: international reserves (rs), current-account 
balance (ca), net inward foreign direct investment 
(fdi) and net inward portfolio investment (fpi). 
Table 3 gives the estimated hyperparameters for the 
unobserved components of the rs series.17
a univariate time series econometric model was constructed. The 
structural models, meanwhile, follow the approach of decomposing 
the series analysed into its unobservable components. The best 
fit for the unobservable components in the structural model of 
international reserves followed the approach suggested by Harvey 
and Koopman (2005). See Harvey (1989) on the advantages of 
univariate structural time series models and on the use of  the 
Kalman filter.
17 The source for all the series used are raw data from the Central 
Bank of Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br). These were processed as follows: 
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TABLE 3
hyperparameters estimated for the reserves 
logarithmic model, 1995-2007




2 571.11 x 10-5 1.0000
σς
2 1.1705 x 10-5 0.0020
ar(1) 3.3239 x 10-5 0.0058
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
Ljung-Box Q (11.7): 13.994 (0.0513). N-BS: 323.15 (0.0000).
The inclusion of an autoregressive term in the 
model presented in table 3 was determined by the 
way the international reserves series for Brazil varies. 
This term also mitigates alterations in the irregularity 
component. Consequently, σε
2 is observed to behave 
non-randomly, and this means that alterations in the 
rs dynamic mainly take the form of changes in the 
linear parameter (level) and the angular parameter 
(slope) of  its trend, ση
2  and σς
2, respectively. Two 
statistics were established following observation of the 
behaviour of the innovations estimated: (A) Ljung-Box 
Q (p,q), which defines a serial autocorrelation test in 
the residuals estimated, and (B) Bowman-Shenton, 
which establishes the normality of the distribution of 
these residuals. The first statistic indicates a lack of 
serial autocorrelation in the disturbances estimated, 
taking a 5% significance level. Where the Bowman-
Shenton statistic (N-BS) is concerned, however, the 
hypothesis that the distribution of  the estimated 
residuals behaves normally is rejected. This finding 
establishes the presence of  high values for these 
innovations, so that observation of  their dynamic 
becomes crucial. Figure 5 presents: (A) the behaviour 
(i) Brazilian international reserves, international liquidity concept 
(rs): this series is obtained in current dollars, seasonally adjusted, 
on the basis that its dynamic might be affected by the trade balance. 
A logarithmic transformation was also implemented when the series 
was decomposed into its unobserved components; (ii) current-
account balance of the Brazilian economy (ca): this aggregate is 
calculated in current dollars, subject to a seasonal adjustment for 
the reason already given in relation to the rs series; (iii) net inward 
foreign direct investment in Brazil (fdi): as with the previous 
series, this aggregate is obtained in current dollars, but no seasonal 
adjustment is required; and (iv) net inward portfolio investment 
in Brazil (fpi): this series too is expressed in current dollars and 
requires no seasonal adjustment.
of rs, (B) the estimated model innovations, (C) the 
estimated residuals of  the irregularity component, 
(D) the estimated residuals of the level of the trend 
and (E) the estimated residuals of the slope of the 
trend, and the periods of  greatest volatility in the 
innovations estimated are made explicit (panel B). It 
is no coincidence that there should have been great 
volatility between October 1997 and April 1999, a 
time of  financial crises in emerging markets (Asia 
in October 1997, Russia in August 1998 and Brazil 
in January 1999). However, the months of greatest 
strain were those from September 1998 to April 
1999, a period of crisis during which the Brazilian 
exchange-rate regime altered. Besides these periods, 
isolated movements can be observed in the volatility of 
these innovations in March and July 1995, associated 
with the uncertainty produced by the Mexican crisis, 
followed by the recovery of reserves. Other periods of 
great volatility came in April 2000 with the Argentinean 
crisis, June 2002 (pre-election period or “Lula effect”) 
and December 2005.
Comparison of  panels B and D shows that 
innovations are heavily influenced by the dynamic of 
the estimated residuals of the level of the trend in the 
rs series. Both the dynamic and the size of the two 
disturbances are similar. Regarding the size of the 
estimated residuals of the unobserved components 
in the rs series, one thing that stands out is that the 
largest of them is in the angular parameter of the 
trend. This indicates that changes in the rs trend occur 
abruptly, i.e., following a break in the trend level of 
this series, not in its slope, which suggests a sudden 
stop dynamic (Izquierdo, Talvi and Calvo, 2006). 
Nonetheless, in April 2006 there was a peak in the 
estimated residuals of the trend slope, so that periods 
of great volatility in the estimated innovations of the 
irregularity component are practically the same as 
those indicated in relation to the estimated residuals 
of the trend level. Owing to the greater amplitude 
of the latter, a level break can be identified as the 
predominant element.
Table 4 details the months in which substantial 
alterations in rs behaviour are most feasible. It turns 
out that including the binary variables in the months 
indicated with extreme values, taking two standard 
deviations, produces a correct fit for the estimated 
residuals. In other words, there is a normal distribution 
in relation to these innovations. Furthermore, taking 
a 5% statistical significance level, the hypothesis that 
the estimated parameters for all the binary variables 
proposed are equal to zero is rejected. The unobserved 
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(A) Behaviour of international reserves (logarithm)
(B) innovations
(C) Estimated residuals for irregularity
(D) Estimated residuals for level
(E) Estimated residuals for slope
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
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component strongly influencing movements in rs is 
confirmed to be their trend level, irrespective of the 
exchange-rate regime.
Another important finding is that statistically 
the rate of reserves growth remained unchanged until 
April 2006, when it began to accelerate, even though 
a floating exchange-rate regime was operating in the 
Brazilian economy. In other words, the pattern of 
reserves accumulation was similar up until April 2006 
under both the managed exchange-rate regimes and 
the floating system. From that time on, reserves growth 
accelerated even though the formal exchange-rate 
regime was one of free flotation. Figure 6 shows the 
alterations that took place in the rs series.
 
TABLE 4
Estimates of binary components for the reserves logarithmic model, 1995-2007
Components Coefficient t-statistic p value
Irregularity dummy (April 1998) 0.07980 2.8378 0.0052
Level dummies (March 1995) –0.13216 –3.324 0.0011
Level dummies (July 1995) 0.23176 5.8462 0.0000
Level dummies (August 1995) 0.12577 3.1725 0.0018
Level dummies (October 1997) –0.12438 –3.1376 0.0020
Level dummies (March 1998) 0.14100 3.5462 0.0005
Level dummies (September 1998) –0.40070 –10.108 0.0000
Level dummies (January 1999) –0.23975 –6.0299 0.0000
Level dummies (April 1999) 0.29051 7.2915 0.0000
Level dummies (December 1999) –0.16135 –4.0377 0.0001
Level dummies (April 2000) –0.28999 –7.2785 0.0000
Level dummies (June 2002) 0.25808 6.4867 0.0000
Level dummies (June 2003) 0.11402 2.8659 0.0047
Level dummies (December 2003) –0.11151 –2.7905 0.0059
Level dummies (December 2005) –0.19044 –4.7658 0.0000
Slope dummies (April 2006) 0.052275 5.6526 0.0000
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
Ljung-Box Q (11.7): 10.974 (0.1398). N-BS: 1.5549 (0.4596)
FIGURE 6
























Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
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It is necessary to particularize the dynamic of 
the rs series shown in figure 4 together with the sign 
of the parameters attained by the binary components 
presented in table 4. The first period delimited was one 
in which the level of rs fell (in March 1995) because 
of  the Mexican crisis, followed by two months of 
strong recovery (July and August 1995). The Asian 
crisis is clearly reflected in the change of level of the 
series analysed in October 1997. In March 1998, the 
volume of rs increased strongly once again. Following 
that month, there was a series of sharp contractions 
in the level of  the decomposed series and in April 
1999 there was a positive change. These deteriorations 
in rs were associated with the financial crises in the 
Russian and Brazilian markets. The Argentinean crisis, 
for its part, shows up in the reserve losses recorded 
in December 1999 and, most particularly, in April 
2000. Positive changes are observed in rs levels until 
December 2003, and there were some small changes in 
that month and in December 2005. This insignificant 
drop in level did not obviously affect the dynamic 
of rs, because in April 2006 a large change in the 
growth rate of this aggregate is indicated, with rs 
accumulation accelerating considerably.
Hitherto, statistical analysis of the international 
reserves time series has reinforced the hypothesis of the 
preceding analysis that exogenously determined liquidity 
cycles influence the behaviour of official interventions 
in the Brazilian currency markets, captured in this 
paper by variations in official reserves. According to 
textbook models, the introduction of a free float in 
1999 should have been followed by a slowdown in the 
build-up of reserves. Not only did this not happen but 
from 2006 there was a structural break in the series 
suggesting an accelerating build-up. This coincides 
with the Central Bank strategy of  improving the 
country’s external solvency profile during an upturn 
in the international liquidity cycle.
With the rs series characterized in its unobserved 
components, the aim of the next exercise will be to pin 
down the determinants of this variable in Brazil during 
the period from January 1995 to December 2007.18 As 
already mentioned, two significant alterations in the 
movement of the rs series were observed: considerable 
volatility between September 1998 and April 1999 and 
an alteration in the rate of rs accumulation growth, 
but only from April 2006. When these movements are 
examined, the focus narrows to three periods in the 
18 The exercise in this section is based on Aizenman and Lee 
(2005).
dynamic of the economic aggregate analysed, covering 
the months from January 1995 to August 1998, May 
1999 to March 2006 and April 2006 to December 2007, 
respectively. The number of months in the last period 
is rather small for the purposes of the econometric 
exercise proposed in this section. The econometric 
method is applied in a way that uses the association 
between the second and third periods, controlling for 
the change of slope in the rs series by the addition of 
binary variables. The statistical model that will be used 
in the attempt to identify the structural determinants 
of rs in Brazil will be applied to two periods, then: 
from January 1995 to July 1998 and from May 1999 
to December 2007. Equation (1) identifies the basic 
model, considering an equation in level form, which 
is to be estimated:
  (1)
where ca represents the current-account balance, fdi 
is net inward foreign direct investment, fpi denotes 
net foreign portfolio investment and ε symbolizes the 
effects of the variables not included in the proposed 
model.19
When the unit root tests are carried out on the 
series indicated in equation (1) for the first period 
established, it transpires that the rs series is the only 
one to be first-order cointegrated, i.e., it concludes 
with the presence of a unit root (Enders, 2004). The 
presence of a unit root is not observed for the other 
series, which correspond to I(0).20 The characterization 
of  series I(1) and I(0) determines the need to use 
equation (1) in difference form:
 
 (2)
Equation (2) was initially estimated without 
considering the breaks referred to in the exercise 
whereby the rs series was decomposed into its 
unobserved components. The binary variables referred 
to were then included and the resulting alterations 
19 It should be recalled that the exercise in this section consists of 
determination models, which means that we are not attempting 
to predict reserve movements, so that it is clearer to characterize 
ε as omitted variables.
20 The statistical responses obtained are independent of the test 
specified, whether augmented Dickey-Fuller (adf) or Phillips-
Perron (pp).
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observed. Table 5 presents the statistical results of the 
model defined earlier for the January 1995 to August 
1998 period, without dummies.
TABLE 5
reserves model without inclusion of binary 
variables
(January 1995-August 1998)
Variable βi t-statistic p value
Constant 713.27 0.9976 0.3240
Δ (ca) 0.6573 2.8313 0.0075
Δ (fdi) 0.0934 0.2699 0.7887
Δ (fpi) 0.8916 4.5143 0.0001
ar(1) 0.4941 3.2579 0.0024
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
R2: 0.52347
Akaike information criterion: 18.46272 
Schwartz information criterion: 18.66958 
Durbin-Watson: 1.8507
White heteroskedasticity: 3.2523 (0.7766) 
An ar(1) term is included in an attempt to correct 
the serial autocorrelation in the residuals estimated. 
Nonetheless, the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic is in 
an unclear area.21 In this first model estimated, the 
components influencing the variations in rs are fpi 
and ca, so that the estimated value of the parameter 
linked to the first variable is higher than that of the 
second. This result assigns a greater influence to capital 
movements intended for foreign portfolio investment 
in determining rs variations (see section III).
Table 6 details the statistics of the model estimated 
for the first period, considering the alterations in 
level of the trend for the rs series identified earlier. 
Dummies were introduced for changes in level from 
March 1995, July 1995, August 1995, October 1997 and 
March 1998. It should be stressed, however, that we 
are working with series in differences, and the test for 
structural change in the linear parameter of the trend 
was applied to the series in level. Thus, considering the 
characterization of expression (2), what are obtained 
are specific binary variables, i.e., the unit value for just 
21 We then implemented the Breusch-Godfrey (B-G) serial correlation 
test, prescribing a statistic of 0.7090 with a p value of 0.3998 and 
rejecting the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals estimated. 
Furthermore, the White test for heteroskedasticity (W-H) does not 
reject homoskedasticity in the innovations estimated. Consequently 
the behaviour specified for the residuals agrees with traditional 
statistics theory.
the month where the behaviour of the series changes. 
In this way, an alteration in the linear parameter of 
the series in level (level dummies) becomes just a 
disturbance in the series in difference.
The D-W statistic is once again in an intermediate 
area, but implementing the B-G test establishes a 
statistic of 0.1692 with a p value of 0.6808, determining 
the rejection of serial correlation for the innovations 
estimated. The W-H test determines rejection of 
heteroskedastic behaviour for the residuals. The Akaike 
and Schwartz information criteria and R2 indicate 
that this model is a better fit for the data than the 
model presented in table 5. Nonetheless, the variables 
considered statistically significant in explaining the 
movements of rs at a 5% level now require a 10% 
statistical significance level. In other words, when a 
level of significance with a lower tolerance is taken, 
the shocks caused by international crises provide a 
better explanation for rs behaviour than the Brazilian 
balance-of-payments accounts. Consequently, when 
a 10% statistical significance level is taken, the same 
variables as proved decisive in explaining rs variations 
in the model set out in table 5 continue to present the 
same property. It is striking, however, that the value 
of the parameter related to fpi was lower than that 
for ca. In other words, when abrupt changes in the 
level of  the aggregate analysed are controlled for, 
the current-account balance is more important than 
movements in net inward portfolio investment in 
TABLE 6
reserves model with inclusion of binary 
variables
(January 1995-August 1998)
Variable βi t-statistic p value
Constant 475.54 1.5187 0.1381
Δ (ca) 0.4722 1.8125 0.0787
Δ (fdi) 0.3749 0.9424 0.3526
Δ (fpi) 0.4111 1.9463 0.0599
DU 1995/03 –3529.20 –1.7478 0.0895
DU 1995/07 6724.50 3.3719 0.0019
DU 1995/08 5205.10 2.6666 0.0116
DU 1997/10 –7815.51 –3.7110 0.0007
DU 1998/03 7066.89 2.9840 0.0052
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
R2: 0.70484
Akaike information criterion: 18.14289
Schwartz information criterion: 18.51151
Durbin-Watson: 1.8284
White heteroskedasticity: 6.9518 (0.80297)
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explaining rs variations. Consequently, reserves loss 
or accumulation shocks, expressed in the dummies, 
relate more to movements originating in fpi than in 
ca in the period between January 1995 and August 
1998. Lastly, it is observed that the signs encountered 
in the binary variables listed in this model are identical 
to those established in the exercise of decomposing 
rs into their unobserved components, confirming the 
good fit of the statistics presented in table 6.
The same exercise was then applied to the second 
period, May 1995 to December 2007. Regarding 
the degree of cointegration of the series selected, it 
transpires that the rs series is I(1), irrespective of the 
unit root test applied. The tests applied to the ca and 
FPI aggregates presented divergences. When the adf  
statistic was used, both series were I(1), whereas with 
the Phillips-Perron (pp) method they came out as I(0). 
In the fdi series both tests indicate an absence of unit 
root. Consequently, the econometric exercise structured 
as per expression (2) is delimited in this second period. 
The results in table 7 do not incorporate the binary 
variables and there is an observable need to impose 
an ar(1) term on the structure proposed in order to 
correct the serial autocorrelation established in the 
residuals estimated. Furthermore, this specification 
does not manifest the problem of heteroskedasticity 
in the innovations. As for the variables that are 
important in determining the rs variations, the only 
one that showed statistical relevance was fpi, taking 
a 10% significance level.
In the next model estimated, account is taken of 
alterations in the rs series, which are demonstrated in 
the decomposition exercise for that aggregate. There 
was an alteration in the rs volume growth rate from 
April, giving rise to the introduction of a dummy 
alteration variable in the slope of the statistical model 
to be characterized.22 Table 8 sets out the statistical 
results arrived at with this new specification.
Notwithstanding the lack of serial autocorrelation 
in the residuals estimated after this component is 
adjusted using an ar(1) term, this characterization 
presents the non-homoskedastic residuals. When 
the results of this model are compared with the one 
detailed in table 7, this difficulty does not prevent us 
from discovering a better data fit. Furthermore, as in 
the previous result, the only variable that presented 
statistical significance in the determination of the rs 
variations was fpi. However, it is necessary to look 
for the weighting of the heteroskedasticity problem 
in the distribution of  the residuals estimated by 
including a White matrix. This new specification is 
presented in table 9.
The heteroskedasticity test employing the White 
matrix indicates that rs are explained solely by shocks. 
In the Brazilian economy, in other words, the balance-
of-payments current account does not determine the
22 A binary slope variable in an econometric architecture in 
difference becomes a level dummy, which assumes the introduction 
of the element “1” after the period delimited, so that a succession 
of zeroes appears first.
TABLE 7
reserves model without inclusion of binary 
variables
(May 1999-December 2007)
Variable βi t-statistic p value
Constant 1 348.19 2.2418 0.0272
Δ (ca) 0.5014 1.5744 0.1186
Δ (fdi) 0.0232 0.2202 0.8262
Δ (fpi) 0.2136 1.8940 0.0612
ar(1) 0.4142 4.4768 0.0000
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
R2: 0.2034
Akaike information criterion: 19.23801 
Schwartz information criterion: 19.36668 
Durbin-Watson: 2.1977
White heteroskedasticity: 7.07613 (0.3138)
TABLE 8
reserves model with inclusion of binary 
variables
(May 1999-December 2007)
Variable βi t-statistic p value
Constant 591.87 1.417 0.1599
Δ (ca) 0.2466 1.0440 0.2993
Δ (fdi) 0.0415 0.5444 0.5875
Δ (fpi) 0.1923 2.3504 0.0208
DU 1999/12 –6 912.95 –2.9300 0.0043
DU 2000/04 10 306.72 –4.3867 0.0000
DU 2002/06 9 636.61 4.1338 0.0001
DU 2003/06 3 880.25 1.6515 0.1021
DU 2003/12 –6 710.77 –2.8756 0.0050
DU 2005/12 12 398.99 –5.2673 0.0000
DU 2006/04 4 691.50 5.2545 0.0000
ar(1) 0.3359 3.2719 0.0015
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
R2: 0.6486
Akaike information criterion: 18.55682 
Schwartz information criterion: 18.86564 
Durbin-Watson: 2.0656
White heteroskedasticity: 41.2922 (0.0000)
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volume of international reserves absorbed. Although 
it is a better fit, the model presented in table 9 does not 
permit a statistical specification of the macroeconomic 
aggregates conditioning rs variations in Brazil. Indeed, 
observation of the variance in the residuals estimated 
shows this rising after April 2006 to a value of 1.51 x 
107. For the purposes of comparison, between May 
1999 and March 2006 this value was 2.97 x 106. This 
alteration was established in the month that marked 
the turning point in the downward trend of the rs 
series. The choice was thus made to exclude the months 
following this turning point and, consequently, the 
binary variable representing the change in the rate 
of  growth in the series analysed, with the model 
being restructured using a period from May 1999 to 
March 2006.
The statistics estimated, adjusted to the new 
suggested period, can be observed in table 10. In 
addition, an ar(1) term was introduced into the new 
model to correct the autocorrelation of the residuals 
estimated. The evidence provided by these new estimates 
suggests that the hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the 
innovations is to be rejected, establishing a behaviour 
pattern for these components that fits traditional 
statistics theory. The main determinant of variations 
in Brazilian rs is net inward portfolio investment. This 
finding agrees with the previous exercise, which did 
not include the binary variables of the econometric 
model (the period including the turning point in the 
decline of the series analysed was excluded).
Indeed, it can be stated in general that the fpi 
variable is the main determinant of  international 
reserves accumulation in the Brazilian economy 
throughout the period considered. Nonetheless, a 
longer series is badly needed so that the behaviour of 
reserves in the period subsequent to April 2006 can 
be analysed and this finding confirmed. Something 
else that has emerged is the importance of external 
shocks associated with financial boom and bust 
cycles, something already ascertained in the analysis 
of section III.
TABLE 9
reserves model with inclusion of binary 
variables and white matrix
(May 1999-December 2007)
Variable βi t-statistic p value
Constant 591.87 1.7680 0.0804
Δ (ca) 0.2466 1.1089 0.2704
Δ (fdi) 0.0415 0.6153 0.5399
Δ (fpi) 0.1923 1.4505 0.1504
DU 1999/12 –6 912.95 –12.4519 0.0000
DU 2000/04 –10 306.72 –17.2839 0.0000
DU 2002/06 9 636.61 6.4099 0.0000
DU 2003/06 3 880.25 8.1172 0.0000
DU 2003/12 –6 710.77 –5.5780 0.0000
DU 2005/12 –12 398.99 –10.2520 0.0000
DU 2006/04 4 691.50 3.3512 0.0012
ar(1) 0.3359 2.6354 0.0099
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil.
R2: 0.6486
Akaike information criterion: 18.55682 
Schwartz information criterion: 18.86564 
Durbin-Watson: 2.0656
White heteroskedasticity: 41.2922 (0.0000)
TABLE 10
rs model with inclusion of binary variables
(May 1999-March 2006)
Variable βi t-statistic p value
Constant 488.35 1.7912 0.0776
Δ (ca) 0.3482 1.6369 0.1061
Δ (fdi) 0.1617 1.0161 0.3131
Δ (fpi) 0.2253 2.1729 0.0332
DU 1999/12 –6 709.98 –3.7100 0.0004
DU 2000/04 –9966.65 –5.5026 0.0000
DU 2002/06 9 283.40 5.2165 0.0000
DU 2003/06 4 047.44 2.2551 0.0273
DU 2003/12 –6 382.83 –3.5765 0.0006
DU 2005/12 –11 894.95 –6.5661 0.0000
ar(1) 0.2393 2.0330 0.0458
Source: Central Bank of  Brazil. 
R2: 0.6514
Akaike information criterion: 17.97613 
Schwartz information criterion: 18.30130 
Durbin-Watson: 2.0070
White heteroskedasticity: 17.4059 (0.1349)
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This article set out to reveal the extent to which 
management of the floating exchange-rate system in 
Brazil did or did not partake of the tendency observed 
among the main emerging economies to adopt a 
“dirty float” strategy in practice. The existence of an 
international financial environment marked by cycles of 
exogenously determined optimism and pessimism would 
appear to provoke reactions such as “fear of floating” 
or the precautionary build-up of international reserves. 
The econometric exercises conducted suggest that: (i) 
the reserves accumulation pattern was statistically 
similar in the periods during which a managed (1995-
1998) and floating (1999-2006) exchange-rate regime 
was applied; (ii) from April 2006 a major structural 
shift is seen, with the reserves build-up accelerating; 
(iii) exogenously determined financial cycles seem to 
influence reserves movements; and (iv) capital flows 
appear to affect reserves more than flows of goods, 
services and income (current account).
Similarly, this article has sought to examine some 
institutional peculiarities of the Brazilian situation, 
including the substantial depth of  the country’s 
derivatives markets, which greatly increases the 
vulnerability of the exchange rate in these cycles. It 
was also shown that the management of the floating 
exchange-rate system in Brazil has been subordinated 
to the more general goal of price stabilization (i.e., to 
the inflation targeting regime), something that is not 
exclusive to Brazil. In this context, with the level of the 
exchange rate neglected as a policy goal after 2003, the 
authorities ceased to use exchange-rate management 
to defend the external competitiveness of exports, a 
strategy that seems to have been applied time and again 
in Asian economies. According to analyses like that 
of Rodrik (2007), this option can pose a risk, even in 
the medium term, to the maintenance of trade and 
current-account surpluses that are robust enough 
to permanently and sustainably offset the country’s 
external vulnerability.
Emphasis must be laid on the high fiscal cost of 
the strategy of official currency market intervention 
by the Central Bank of Brazil (and thus of reserves 
accumulation) and we need to ask whether, within 
the same economic policy framework, the Brazilian 
monetary authority might not be able to employ a 
combination of different instruments in the spot and 
derivatives markets. Unlike currency purchases in the 
spot market, reverse swaps do not increase foreign 
currency liquidity, but they do entail equally high 
fiscal costs for the Treasury. The Central Bank could 
have opted for a strategy of intervention in the spot 
currency market and had a greater influence on the 
appreciation trend of the real. This would have allowed 
it to make less use of these derivatives or replace them 
with operations in the bm&f  forward market which, 
while less transparent than swaps (carried out via 
auctions), would be more effective at moderating the 
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